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12/10/71  
meetingTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLYTalking Points South AsiaDOS Review  
Completed.Background

-- The United States has been keeping the People's Republic of China informed about its various actions designed to restrain Indian actions in the subcontinent.

-- We have told you officially about our strong representations to New Delhi, the December 1 and 3 announcements cutting off all arms shipments to India, approaches to various U.S. allies for political support for Pakistan, the coordination of UN strategy with the Pakistani Government, and the shaping of a UN Security Council resolution to promote Pakistani interests. (Most recent note is at Tab J.)

Additional Steps

-- In the past few days the United States has taken the following additional steps, many of which are known already to the People's Republic of China.

-- Public Line: The White House and the State Department have issued a series of statements deploring Indian actions and fixing major responsibility on New Delhi for the present crisis. On December 7 I gave an extensive background briefing to the press explaining Indian duplicity (text at Tab K).

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-- United Nations. In consultation with Pakistan and other interested countries, we worked for passage of UN Security Council resolutions that would call for withdrawal of forces in addition to a ceasefire in the subcontinent which your northern neighbor vetoed, and for the similar UN General Assembly resolution which passed overwhelmingly.

-- Aid Cutoff. We have taken the following steps concerning military and economic assistance to India:

- . On December 6, 1971 we suspended "general economic aid" in the pipeline for India not already committed to supplies and banks. This totaled some \$87.6 million in non-project loans.
- . We have revoked all outstanding Indian licenses for the export of items on the Munitions Control list and will not issue any new licenses. An estimated \$13.5 million worth of equipment and spares was cut off in the pipeline.
- . We have held up movement on a planned new PL-480 program valued at \$72 million.
- . We are gutting next year's assistance program and already have not gone ahead with the first tranche (\$100 million) of development assistance which had been earlier planned for this fiscal year.

-- Soviet Union. With respect to the Soviet Union, the United States has repeatedly underlined the dangerous implications of the Indian resort

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to war and the Soviet responsibility to exercise restraint.

- . On Sunday, December 5, I called in the Soviet Minister Counsellor Vorontsov and made strong representations to him. Ambassador Dobrynin is in Moscow.
- . On Monday, December 6, President Nixon sent a letter to Secretary Brezhnev which makes unequivocally clear that India's aggression, with Soviet support, is unacceptable to the United States (letter at Tab A). In this letter the President states that achievement by India of its objectives "would long complicate the international situation and undermine the confidence" of US-Soviet relations, having "an adverse effect on a whole range of other issues." The President declared that "the utmost restraint and the most urgent action to end the conflict and restore territorial integrity in the subcontinent" was required.
- . Secretary Brezhnev has sent a somewhat conciliatory reply to the President in a letter dated December 8, 1971 which proposes a ceasefire and "immediate resumption of negotiations between the government of Pakistan and the East Pakistani leaders concerning a political settlement in East Pakistan." The negotiations should "naturally, be started from the stage at which they were discontinued." The Soviets feel their proposal "provides a way out for all, including Pakistan." (Tab B)

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- . Yesterday, December 9, the President warned the Soviets orally during an appointment which was scheduled with the visiting Soviet Minister of Agriculture who is an influential figure in the Soviet Government. He was accompanied by Soviet Minister Counsellor Vorontsov. During the discussion the President emphasized that the U.S. has obligations to Pakistan and that if India were to launch an attack against West Pakistan with Soviet acquiescence this could not but lead to a US-Soviet confrontation.
- . The President's official reply to the Soviet note of December 8 was delivered this morning (December 10, 1971) to the Soviet Minister (Tab C). The President emphasized the need for an "immediate ceasefire in the West" as well as the East, and warned that if this did not take place "we would have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations." He also emphasized Soviet responsibility by virtue of its treaty in restraining India.

-- Pakistan. We have worked closely with the Pakistani Ambassadors in Washington and New York and have kept President Yahya fully informed (Presidential message of December 7 at 8:40 p.m., Tab D).

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- . In a message yesterday (December 9) we told President Yahya about the Soviet proposal, emphasizing that we were conveying it as a friend who wants to help preserve Pakistan and in no way should it be construed as pressure. (Tab E)
- . In his reply (Tab F) President Yahya proposed that (a) India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separate armed forces 'standing fast'; and that the United Nations or other international organization provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; (b) that India and Pakistan 'at any effective level' immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith simultaneously enter into negotiations looking towards the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations, i. e., a political settlement.
- . We have subsequently informed President Yahya that we have made a strong de marche to the Soviets in support of the above provisions and informed him of the strong warnings we have made to the Soviets (Tab G).

-- Military Assistance. We have also told President Yahya that we are exploring with Pakistan's friends the possible ways to facilitate shipment of military equipment to Pakistan. There are legal problems of transferring U.S. equipment from one third country to another. We have encouraged

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particularly the Jordanians, Iranians, and Saudi Arabians. We have the following information to date on intentions of these countries and Turkey:

- . The Jordanians have agreed to move to West Pakistan today four fighter aircraft with Jordanian crews.
- . The Shah of Iran has agreed to provide ammunition and small arms.
- . We have information that Turkey is considering dispatch of six F-5 fighters which would be manned by Pakistani pilots and carry Pakistani markings.

-- U.S. Naval Movements. We have ordered the following ships in the West Pacific to move toward the Indian Ocean.

- . An attack aircraft carrier accompanied by four destroyers and a tanker.
- . A helicopter carrier and two escort destroyers.

(A chart showing Soviet naval ships in the Indian Ocean is at Tab H. There are two destroyers, one submarine, a mincraft and a landing ship as well as other auxiliaries.)

The ships will receive a final go ahead before passing through the Malacca Straits where their presence would probably become public knowledge.

-- U.S. Allies. In his Summit meetings with various allies beginning this weekend with France and Portugal, the President will underline the

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dangerous implications from India and Soviet actions. He has already made these points this week with Prime Minister Trudeau and President Medici of Brazil.

-- PRC

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- . Intelligence. If the PRC wished we would provide intelligence information on Soviet troop movements along the PRC border and related military activities.

- . Military Actions. It is of course up to the People's Republic of China to decide on its own course of action in this situation.
- . The United States would understand if the PRC decided that this situation posed a threat to its security and accordingly redeployed its forces within PRC territory. (In this eventuality the U.S. should oppose attempts by others to intimidate the PRC.)
- . UN Posture. As you know, the Pakistani Army in the East has submitted a proposal for an immediate ceasefire, repatriation with honor of the armed forces to West Pakistan, and other provisions concerning the safety of persons loyal to Pakistan.

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It calls upon the elected representatives of East Pakistan to arrange for the peaceful formation of the government in Dacca and the immediate withdrawal of Indian forces (Tab I). In the UN the United States presently intends to move toward an immediate ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan. It would be helpful to know if the PRC is ready to take a position yet on this issue.

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